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Abstract
We relate the strategy sets that a player ends up with after refining his own
strategies according to two very different models of rationality: namely, utility
maximization and regret minimization.
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1 Introduction
Rational players have been modeled in two main ways.
• A utility-maximizing player U eliminates all his dominated strategies to compute
his set of undominated ones, UD. Notice that U cannot further refine UD based on
utility maximization. If UD consists of a single strategy s (necessarily a dominant
one), then U of course chooses s. But, if UD contains multiple strategies, which
one should U choose?
• A regret-minimizing player R eliminates all his non regret-minimizing strategies
so as to compute his set of regret-minimizing strategies, RM. He might even
continue this process k times, until he is satisfied or no further elimination is
possible. Let us denote the final set of strategies he obtains this way by RMk. If
RMk consists of a single strategy s, R of course chooses s. But, if RMk contains
multiple strategies, which one should R choose?
In both cases, “a random strategy” or “the lexicographic first strategy” are certainly
possible answers. But another answer is that, when he is ‘no longer able to apply
his favorite way of reasoning’, even a die-hard utility maximizer U will resort to
regret minimization to refine UD, and even a die-hard regret minimizer R will resort
to utility maximization to refine RMk. In principle, the two final sets of strategies
obtained by such different refinement procedures could be vastly different. Our next
structural theorem, however, guarantees that they coincide.
Abusing notation a bit, consider UD and RM also to be “operators” acting on
sets of strategies. In this case UD(UD) = UD, while RM2
def
= RM(RM) may be a strict
subset of RM. Then, we prove that the set of strategies obtained after applying, in
arbitrary order, k times the operator RM and at least once the operator UD coincides
with RMk ∩ UD. For instance,
RM(RM(UD(RM(RM(UD))))) = RM4(UD) = RM4 ∩ UD.
After recalling the relevant notions, we prove our theorem for pure strategies, and
then point out its simple but interesting implications for mechanism design. Finally,
we point out that our result extends to mixed strategies as well.
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We recall that regret-minimizing strategies are also known as regret-minimax
strategies. The suggestion of adopting regret-minimizing strategies traces back to
Savage’s reading [Sav51] of the work of Wald [Wal49], and has been axiomatized by
Milnor [Mil54]. The notion of regret has been treated differently in different settings.
A unified axiomatic characterization of minimax regret has been recently given by
Stoye [Sto11].
Many empirical studies compare utility maximizers and regret minimizers, see
for instance Chorus, Arentze and Timmermans [CAT09], and Hensher, Greene and
Chorus [HGC11]. Recently, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok [EK07] and Filiz and
Ozbay [FO07] provide experimental evidence for regret in first- and second-price auc-
tions.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study players who use regret for
refining their sets of undominated strategies.
2 Basic Notions
To state and prove our result, we use the language of decision theory: namely, envis-
aging “a single player against Nature”.1
Let S be a compact set of (pure) strategies of the player, and T a compact set
of states of Nature.2 We denote by U the (continuous) utility function of the player,
where U(s, t) is the utility under strategy s ∈ S when Nature’s state is t ∈ T . Regret-
minimizing strategies and undominated strategies are defined as follows:
• Given a menu S ⊆ S of strategies, the player’s (maximum) regret for a strategy
s ∈ S in menu S, denoted by RS(s), is the maximum difference, taken over all
possible Nature’s states t ∈ T , between the utility the player gets by playing s, and
that he could have gotten by “best responding” to t; formally,
RS(s)
def
= max
t∈T
(
max
s∗∈S
U(s∗, t)− U(s, t)).
1Results for n-player (strategic or pre-Bayesian) games follow as corollaries. This is because the
definitions of dominance and regret are universally quantified over other players’ strategies, which
can be treated as Nature’s strategies.
2Both S and T may be infinite, and S may be convex in order to allow arbitrary mixed strategies
to be considered.
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Therefore, the regret-minimizing strategies with respect to a menu S ⊆ S, denoted
by RM(S), is the set of strategies that minimize the regret:
RM(S)
def
= arg min
s∈S
RS(s).
• Given two strategies s, s′ ∈ S, by definition s′ weakly dominates s, denoted by
s′  s, if
∀t ∈ T, U(s′, t) ≥ U(s, t) and ∃t ∈ T, U(s′, t) > U(s, t) .
Given a menu S ⊆ S of strategies, the player’s undominated strategies consist
of those that are not weakly dominated by any weakly undominated strategy.3
Formally,
UD(S)
def
= S \ {s ∈ S : ∃s′ ∈ S s.t. (s′  s) ∧ (@s′′ ∈ S, s′′  s′)}
= {s ∈ S : @s′ ∈ S s.t. (s′  s) ∧ (@s′′ ∈ S, s′′  s′)}.
We now state two simple facts which easily follow from the above definitions:
Fact 2.1. For any menu S˜ ⊆ S,
(a) if s ≺ s′ for some s, s′ ∈ S˜, then RS˜(s) ≥ RS˜(s′), and
(b) the regret values of a strategy with respect to S˜ and UD(S˜) are the same,
namely:4
RS˜(s) = max
t∈T
(
max
s∗∈S˜
U(s∗, t)−U(s, t)
)
= max
t∈T
(
max
s∗∈UD(S˜)
U(s∗, t)−U(s, t)
)
= RUD(S˜)(s) .
Note that regret minimization is mostly studied when a player has beliefs about his
opponents. In particular, the notions from Hyafil and Boutilier [HB04] and Renou
and Schlag [RS10] coincide with ours when the players do not form beliefs about their
opponents —or, in our language, Nature.
3In general, weakly undominated strategies do not coincide with undominated ones. As argued
by Jackson [Jac92], it may happen that every pure strategy is weakly dominated by another one in
an infinite chain, and in such a case all strategies are undominated but weakly dominated. However,
in many cases of interest (e.g., when the set of pure strategies is finite, or when the mechanism is
bounded), weakly undominated strategies coincide with undominated ones.
4The equality in the middle is since any strategy s∗ ∈ S˜ \ UD(S˜) must be weakly dominated by
some s∗∗ ∈ S˜, giving at least as good utilities as s∗ for any t ∈ T . Therefore, such choices of s∗∗
can be ignored in the inner max.
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3 Result
Established our language, we prove our theorem as a corollary of the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any menu S ⊆ S, UD(RM(S)) = RM(UD(S)) = RM(S) ∩ UD(S).
Proof. We divide the proof into six steps:
1. RM(UD(S)) ⊆ RM(S).
For any s ∈ RM(UD(S)), we show that s ∈ RM(S) by proving that s has minimum
regret among all strategies in S. Indeed:
• For any other strategy s′ ∈ UD(S), it holds that RUD(S)(s) ≤ RUD(S)(s′). By
Fact 2.1b, we deduce that RS(s) ≤ RS(s′).
• For any other strategy s′ ∈ S \ UD(S), it holds that s′ ≺ s′′ for some s′′ ∈
UD(S) and RS(s) ≤ RS(s′′). By Fact 2.1a, we deduce that RS(s) ≤ RS(s′′) ≤
RS(s
′).
2. RM(UD(S)) ⊆ UD(RM(S)).
Given that RM(UD(S)) ⊆ RM(S) (proved above), if there is some s ∈ RM(UD(S))
with s 6∈ UD(RM(S)), then s must be weakly dominated by some other strategy
s′ ∈ RM(S), namely s ≺ s′, but s′ cannot be weakly dominated by any other
strategy in RM(S), by definition of UD.
Now we show that s′ cannot be weakly dominated by any strategy in S as well.
Suppose not, that is s′ ≺ s′′ where s′′ ∈ S. Then s′′ 6∈ RM(S) as we have just
argued. However, using Fact 2.1a we have RS(s
′) ≥ RS(s′′), implying that s′′ ∈
RM(S) since s′ ∈ RM(S), giving a contradiction to s′′ 6∈ RM(S).
In sum, we showed that s is weakly dominated by s′ ∈ S, and in addition s′ cannot
be weakly dominated by any strategy in S, contradicting the fact that s ∈ UD(S).
3. UD(RM(S)) ⊆ UD(S).
Suppose not, that is, there exists some s ∈ UD(RM(S)) that is not in UD(S). By
the definition of UD(S), the strategy s must be weakly dominated by some s′ ∈ S,
4
and in addition s′ cannot be weakly dominated by any other strategy in S. There
are two cases here.
• The first case is when s′ ∈ RM(S). This case is impossible because s ∈
UD(RM(S)) implies that if s is weakly dominated by s′ ∈ RM(S), then s′
must also be weakly dominated, contradicting the fact that s′ cannot be
weakly dominated by any strategy in S.
• The second case is when s′ 6∈ RM(S). Since s ≺ s′, by Fact 2.1a we have
RS(s) ≥ RS(s′). However, because s ∈ UD(RM(S)) implies that s ∈ RM(S),
it must hold that s′ is a regret minimizer with respect to S, contradicting the
fact that s′ 6∈ RM(S).
4. UD(RM(S)) ⊆ RM(UD(S)).
Given that UD(RM(S)) ⊆ UD(S) (proved above), consider any strategy s ∈
UD(RM(S)), and suppose that s 6∈ RM(UD(S)). Then there exists some s′ ∈
UD(S) satisfying RUD(S)(s) > RUD(S)(s
′). This implies, through Fact 2.1b, that
RS(s) > RS(s
′), contradicting the fact that s ∈ RM(S).
5. RM(UD(S)) ⊆ RM(S) ∩ UD(S).
Trivial given the previous steps: RM(UD(S)) ⊆ UD(S) and RM(UD(S)) = UD(RM(S)) ⊆
RM(S).
6. RM(S) ∩ UD(S) ⊆ RM(UD(S)).
Take any strategy s ∈ RM(S) ∩ UD(S), and suppose that s 6∈ RM(UD(S)). Then
there exists some s′ ∈ UD(S) satisfying RUD(S)(s) > RUD(S)(s′). This implies,
through Fact 2.1b, that RS(s) > RS(s
′), contradicting the fact that s ∈ RM(S).

It is not hard to see that Lemma 1 implies our theorem. That is,
Theorem 1. From any menu S ⊆ S, the set of strategies obtained by applying, in
arbitrary order, i times the operator RM and at least once the operator UD, is:
RMi(S) ∩ UD(S) .
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4 Implications for Mechanism Design
Mechanism design enables a social planner to generate a desirable outcome by lever-
aging the rationality (and the beliefs) of the players. Most works in mechanism
designs assume the players to be utility maximizers. In particular, implementation in
undominated strategies traces back to Jackson [Jac92]. However, mechanism design
also considers regret minimizers. In particular, Linhart and Radner [LR89] study
regret-minimizing strategies in a sealed-bid mechanism for bilateral bargaining under
complete information. Engelbrecht-Wiggans [Eng89] and Selten [Sel89] analyze first-
and second-price sealed-bid auctions by incorporating regret for the bidders. Halpern
and Pass [HP12] propose the solution concept of iterated regret minimization using
beliefs, and argue that it actually is the only one capable of explaining the actual
behavior of the players in some settings.
If a mechanism ensures that each player has a unique undominated strategy, then
that strategy is also dominant, and thus the only regret-minimizing one. However, it
is not always possible to design such mechanisms. The designer of a new mechanism
M may never be sure that M will be played solely by utility-maximizing players, nor
that it will be played solely by regret-minimizing players. In principle, if he designs
M so that it implements a social choice correspondence f in undominated strategies,
then M might produce a non desired outcome when one of the players is a regret
minimizer, and viceversa.
We wish to quickly point out that Theorem 1 has an immediate but reassuring
consequence for mechanism design.
Assume that a mechanism M implements a social choice correspondence f
whenever each player chooses a strategy is a strategy subset that coincides ei-
ther with RM or with UD. Then M is automatically guaranteed to implement
f whenever each player chooses a strategy in his set RM(UD).
For instance, a mechanism implementing f for regret minimizers continues to imple-
ment f when the players are utility maximizers who resort to regret only for further
refining, if needed, their sets of undominated strategies.
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5 Pure vs. Mixed Strategies
So far we have been ambiguous, when discussing undominated strategies and regret-
minimizing ones, about whether or not the players consider only pure strategies or also
mixed ones. When only pure strategies are allowed, a utility maximizer compares only
between his pure strategies for the notion of dominance and plays a pure undominated
one, while a regret minimizer picks a pure strategy that minimizes regret among his
pure strategies.
Our theorem and lemma are stated for pure strategies.
When mixed strategies are allowed, the definitions of UD and RM need more
careful attention. It is easy to see that, when considering mixed strategies for regret
minimizers, the only change needed is to allow such a minimizer to choose a mixed
strategy that minimizes his expected regret among all his mixed ones (see e.g., [HB04,
HP12]). Note that, it is easy to construct examples in which a mixed strategy yields
strictly smaller regret than any pure strategy.
It is important to realize, however, that if we allow regret minimizers to consider
mixed strategies, we should also allow utility maximizers to consider mixed strategies.
For instance, our structural lemma (Lemma 1) would have difficulty to equate a set
of pure strategies and a set of mixed ones. A utility maximizer may consider mixed
strategies when determining that a strategy s is weakly dominated by another strategy
s′. The two interesting cases to consider are (1) s is pure and s′ is mixed; and (2)
both s and s′ are mixed. Traditionally, most attention has been devoted to the first
case, but the second has been studied too (see for instance [CS05, RS10]). Clearly,
UD can be defined in both cases, and yields a more “refined” set of strategies in the
second case.5 It is actually under this more refined case that our structural lemma
holds. In a sense, we have nothing to lose and something to gain by adopting a more
flexible definition, after all the right notions are those yielding the right theorems.
5Let UDpure be the set of (pure) undominated strategies in the first case, and UD be the set of
(possibly mixed) undominated strategies in the second case. Then, UD is a more “refined” notion of
undominated strategies than UDpure because UDpure ⊆ UD ⊆ ∆(UDpure), i.e., UDpure coincides with
the support of UD. For this reason, there is no difference in choosing between the two notions in
most of the literature (see [CS05, footnote 2]).
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